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Released Time Education
julie Edwards
Introduction
The First Amendment, made applicable to the states
by the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits state and
national laws "respecting an establishment of religion." Its
purpose is to promote religious freedom for all without
governmental interference or favoritism. Pursuant to
statut01y authorization, the New York City Board of
Education established a program t:hat allows parents to
request that their children be released from public school
instruction for religious instntction or devotionals for a
limited time each day. Students are allowed to leave the
school buildings and grounds to go to religious centers for
religious instruction or devotional exercises. The same
provision makes school attendance compulsory. The
students not released stay in the classrooms, and the
churches report to the schools the names of children
released from public school who fail to report for religious
instruction. The regulation further specifies that such
programs involve neither religious instruction in public
school buildings nor the expenditure of public funds
(Zorach u. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 308-9).
The law was challenged by taxpayers and residents
of New York City and whose children attend its public
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schools. They contended that both the First Amendment
to the United States Constitution and the New York
Constitution, Article I section 3, were violated by the
released time program. They asserted that the weight
and influence of the school is put behind the program for
religious instruction. They argued that the public school
teachers police the program by keeping tab on the
students who are released and by halting classroom
activities until the students on leave return from their
religious instruction. The plaintiffs also believed that the
school was a crutch on which the churches leaned for
support in their religious training; that without the
cooperation of the schools the ·'released time" program
would be unsuccessful (303 N.Y. 161; 100 N.E.2d 463).
The case that developed in 1952 became known as
Zorach l ' . Clauson (343 U.S. 306). To support their
position the plaintiffs cited the 1948 decision of Jl1cCollurn
l!. Board ofEducation (333 U.S. 203) in which the United
States Supreme Court four years earlier held that a
released time program in Champaign County, Illinois was
unconstitutional (RH. 86).
The il1cCollum case arose when the petitioner
challenged the legality of the plan of released time
whereby religious teachers employed by the Champaign
Council on Religious Education went to public school
buildings during the regular hours set apart for secular
instmction and then there gave instruction in religion as a
substitute for the secular education provided by the
compulsory education law (Yianilos 199>. It found that
tax-supported property was being used for religious
education and that there was material assistance in the
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promotion of various sectarian beliefs. The Court
therefore held the program was a utilization of the taxestablished and tax-supported public school system to aiel
religious sects in propagating their beliefs, thereby falling
within the ban of the Fourteenth Amendment as
interpreted in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1
(1947) (American Civil Liberties Union 46).
Majority Opinion

· After the JV!cColfum decision, the courts of New
York continued to declare the 11 released time11 programs
constitutional, contending that the cases could be
distinguished on their facts from the McCollum case
(Antonis 122). The decision in the il1cCollwn case
particularly focused attention on programs of week-day
religious education operating in cooperation with the
public-school system. The issue in Zorach v. Clauson was
whether New York had either prohibited the "free
exercise'' of religion or had made a law ''respecting an
establishment of religion" within the meaning of the First
Amendment.
There is language in the opinions of the McColfum
case which can be used to justify at least two approaches.
The first states that all ·'released time'' programs violate the
First Amendment. The second states that "released time''
programs are not unconstitutional per se, but the facts of
each case must be considered to determine whether there
is an infringeme nt CR.H. 89). In deciding principal for the
case, the Court of Appeals chose the second approach and
held that on the facts therein presented, neither the State
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Constitution nor the Fede ral Constitution was infringed
upon by the released time program in operation in New
York City. The court's opinion addressed these arguments
and d rew a careful distinction between New York's
"released time" program and the McCollum plan. It was
pointed out by Justice Douglas that there was no coercion
to attend religious instruction and ·'no religious exercise or
instruction is brought to the classrooms of the public
schools" (343 U.S. 306, 312). The New York court held
that the lesser amount of school support in the New York
program constitutionally distinguished it from the
Champaign plan, and it considered itself bound by earlier
New York precedent upholding a similar program.
The court reasoned that elimination of the program
would impair parents' right to direct the rearing and
education of their children (''Released Time Reconsidered"
409). Released time is thus attacked as aid and justified as
free exercise. By emphasizing the free exercise of
religion, the New York court upheld the statute. If the
released time program were invalidated, the resulting
restraint upon the free exercise of religion would be the
inability of parents who so desired to have religious
instruction given to their children during one hour of
public school time weekly.
Minority Opinion

Justices Black, Frankfurter and Jackson each
dissented from the majority opinion of the Supreme Court.
Justice Black held the opinion that the New York City
program was a "combination of Church and State" because
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of "the use of the State's compulsory public school
machinery" (343 U.S. 306, 316). Justice Frankfurter
contended that, with the released time program, sectarian
education was being substituted for secular education with
the cooperation of the City and that the program involved
coercion. Justice Jackson joined Justice Frankfurter's
opinion and added that the City was virtually rounding up
customers for the religious education program (Cord 172).
The Positions of the ACLU and Robert Cord

The ACLU believes that the opening words of the
First Amendment to the Constitution sets forth a dual
guarantee of religious liberty. Both the "establishment
clause" and the "free exercise clause" operate to protect
the religious liberty and freedom of conscience of all
Americans. They further their position stating that one of
the fundamental principles of the Supreme Court's
Establishment Clause jurisprudence is that the Constitution
forbids not only state practices that "aid one religion .. . or
prefer one religion over another,·· but also those practices
that "aid all religions" and thus endorse or prefer religion
over non-religion (Lynn 1-3, 67). Regarding released time
education, the ACLU has taken the position that schools
have the discretion to dismiss students to off-premises
re ligious instmction, provided that schools do not
encourage or discourage participation or penalize those
who do not attend; however, schools may not allow
religious instruction by outsiders on premises during the
school day (ACLU, "Religion in Public Schools").
Robert L. Cord, a Professor of Political Science at
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Northeast~rn.

University, furthers the position taken by the
ACLU behevmg that the separation of Church and State as
envisioned by Jefferson and Madison in the Fi rst
Amendment of the Constitution is consistent w ith a
moderate separationist approach. "The state may choose
to ~tse ~e~t.arian means to accomplish secular ends as long
as 1t reframs from the assumption of ecclesiastical
authority or sectarian partisanship" (Buckley xi). Corel
~nther states tha~ those who agree with the complete
mdependence of religion and government have precluded
the making of vital public policy decisions where the
Constitution intended them to be made in the free and
open arena of the political process. Justice Douolas's
opinion for the Court in Zorach emphasized tha~ the Court
is not endorsing the New York program as a wise
educational institution but stresses that those value
judgments are political considerations that are not relevant
to the constitutional issue (Cord, 174).
Writer's Position

Judge Desmond brought the real problem into
focus when he stated in the concurring opinion:
The basic fundamental here at hazard is
not . . . any so-called (but nonexistent) . . .
"principle" of complete separation of
religion from government . ... The true and
real principle that calls for assertion here is
that of the right of parents to control the
education of their children, so long as they
provide them with the State-mandated
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minimum of secular learning, and the right
of parents to raise and instruct their children
in any religion chosen by the parents . . ..
Those are tme and absolute rights under
natural law, antedating, and superior to, any
human constitution or statute. (Antonis 123)
Quoting Kent, Judge Desmond pointed out in his
concluding sentence, "the Constitution 'never meant to
withdraw religion in general, and with it the best sanctions
of moral and social obligation, from all consideration and
notice of the law"' (Antonis 124). The first Amendment
reflects the philosophy that Church and State should be
separated. And so far as interference with the ''free
exercise" of religion and an "establishment'' of religion are
concerned, the separation must be complete and
unequ ivocal. However, the First Amendment does not say
that, in all respects there shall be a separation of Church
and State. It studiously defines the manner, the specific
ways, in which there shall be no concert or union or
dependency one on the other.
In support of Judge Desmond's observation the
United States has more than 1,500 different religious
bodies, and 360,000 churches, mosques, and synagogues;
the U.S. is the most religiously diverse, and one of the
most devout countries in the world. Moreover, there is
unparalleled religious liberty and sectarian strife is
relatively rare. Ninety percent of Americans believe in
God; more than half say they pray at least once a day, and
church membership has remained at the same level-63
percent of the population according to the Census
Bureau-for more than thirty years (ACLU, "Protecting
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Freedom"). Justice William 0. Douglas explained it best
when :writing the opinion of the United States Supreme
Court m Zorach u. Clauson:
\X!e are religious people whose institutions
presuppose a Supreme Being. We are
guaranteed the freedom to worship as one
chooses. We make room for as wide a
variety of beliefs and creeds as the spiritual
needs of man deem necessary. We sponsor
an attitude on the part of government that
shows no partiality to any one group and
that lets each flou rish according to the zea l
of its adherents and the appeal of its dogma.
Government may not finance religious
groups nor undertake religious instruction
nor blend secular and sectarian education
nor use secular institutions to force one or
some religion on any person. But we find
no constitutional requi rement which makes
it necessaty for government to be hostile to
r~ligion and to throw its weight against
efforts to widen the effective scope of
religious influence. The government must
be neutral when it comes to competition
between sects. When the state encouraaes
religious instruction or cooperates with o
religious authotities by adjusting the
schedule of public events to sectarian needs,
it follows the best of our traditions. For it
then respects the religious nature of our
people and accommodates the public
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service to their spiritual needs. (343 U.S.
306, 313-314)

Current Situation
The neutral position taken by the Supreme Court in
Zorach u. Clauson, has made it impossible for there to be
a criterion established in which to base h1ture Court
decisions. The Courts bave been left to develop criteria
with which to determine when "alleged" aid to religion
has been in keeping with the Federal Constitution and
when it has not (Cord, 180). Developing this criteria has
essentially demanded a case-by-case review by the United
States Supreme Court of almost every claim pressed in _the
state and lower federal courts that the Establishment of
Religion Clause of the First and Fourteenth Amendments
has been violated.
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Constitutional Law- Religious Libe rty Compulsory Flag Salute:
Minersville School District v. Gobitis
Todd Lundell
Facts ofthe Case
The School Board of Minersville, Pennsylvania,
under the authority of the state, adopted a resolution
makino it compulsoty to salute the flag and recite the
pledg; of allegiance as part of a daily patri?t~c exercise.
As members of the Jehovah's Witnesses relig1ous group,
the Gobitis children, ages twelve and ten, believed that
saluting the flag was a type of idol worship and that one's
allegiance should only be given to God. In a~~ordm~ce
with these beliefs the children refused to part1c1pate m
either the salute or the allegiance ceremonies. After being
expelled from school, their father brought suit to compel
the school board to reinstate them, alleging that the
expulsion directly violated the First and Fourte~nth
Amendments. An injunction against the expulston was
granted by the Federal District Court (21. F. Supp. 581) and
was upheld by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals (108 F.
2d 683). The case came before the Supreme Court of the
United States on April 25, 1940 (310 U.S. 586).

